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BRUESEWITZ V. WYETH:
THE “UNAVOIDABLE” VACCINE
PROBLEM
SARA WEXLER

I.

INTRODUCTION
1

With fear of vaccines on the rise and the resurgence of Whooping
2
Cough (Pertussis) nearing epidemic proportions in California, now is
a particularly apt time for the Supreme Court to assess the National
3
4
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (Vaccine Act). Bruesewitz v. Wyeth
provides the Court with this opportunity. In Bruesewitz, the Court
addresses whether federal law preempts state tort claims under the
5
Vaccine Act. How the statutory text is interpreted—specifically
whether the Court will interpret “unavoidable” in the Vaccine Act to
preempt design-defect claims—will determine whether a state jury,
rather than a special master in Vaccine Court, may decide whether a
differently designed vaccine could have prevented the resulting side
6
effects.
Bruesewitz’s outcome will affect more than just who will decide
vaccine-design claims. According to the respondent Wyeth, a
pharmaceutical company, permitting state juries to assess these claims
will impair the vaccine market and injure the public as vaccine
manufacturers withdraw from the market due to the rising cost of
7
litigation. Conversely, petitioner Bruesewitz, the family of a child


J.D. Candidate, 2012, Duke University School of Law.
1. Brian Deer, How the Case Against the MMR Vaccine Was Fixed, 342 BRITISH MED. J.
77 (2011); Jennifer Steinhauser, Public Health Risk Seen As Parents Reject Vaccines, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2008, at 1.
2. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Whooping Cough Fight Broadens; Officials Urge More
Vaccinations As Number of Cases Surges, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at AA 1.
3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-34 (West 2010).
4. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. argued Oct. 12, 2010).
5. Brief for Respondent at i, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. July 23, 2010).
6. Id. at 4–5.
7. See id. at 55–57; Brief for American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) et al. as Amici
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injured by the Pertussis vaccine, views state-court liability as vital to
compelling vaccine manufacturers to continue enhancing the safety
8
and technology of vaccines. Although Bruesewitz has garnered
9
relatively little media attention, the decision will have a direct and
10
significant impact on the health and welfare of American children.
II. FACTS
Like millions of other infants in the 1990s, Hannah Bruesewitz
received the DPT vaccine to protect her against Diphtheria, Pertussis,
11
and Tetanus. The Federal Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices recommended that children receive five doses of the DPT
12
vaccine before they turn six years old. On April 1, 1992, an
apparently healthy six-month-old Hannah received her third dose of
the Wyeth Tri-Immunol DPT vaccine and experienced seizures within
13
hours. Over the next eleven years, Hannah continued to have
seizures; doctors diagnosed her with “pervasive developmental
14
disorder and seizure disorder.” To this day, Hannah suffers from
15
residual seizure disorder and developmental impairment; she
requires “intensive high-quality one-on-one” occupational and speech
16
therapy and will likely require medical care for the rest of her life.
In 1995, the Bruesewitz family filed a claim in Vaccine Court for
17
Hannah’s DPT-related injuries. Established under the Vaccine Act,
the Vaccine Court was created as part of the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program (NVICP), which provides a compensation
18
scheme for vaccine-related injury claims. The Act requires a person

Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15–18, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. July 23, 2010).
8. Brief for Petitioners at 51–57, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. May 24, 2010);
Brief for Mark Geistfeld as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3–4, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth,
No. 09-152 (U.S. May 24, 2010); Brief for American Association for Justice (AAJ) as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10–27, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. May 24, 2010).
9. A LexisNexis search of “Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants’ Association” in
the “News, Most Recent 2 Years” database yielded 110 results and “Snyder v. Phelps” yielded
327 articles while “Bruesewitz v. Wyeth” yielded only 81 results.
10. See Steinhauser, supra note 1 (citing cases in which parents have refused vaccinations
for their children leading to deleterious health effects).
11. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 19.
12. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2009).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 236.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 237.
18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-10 (West 2010).
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injured by a vaccine to bypass the civil-litigation system and pursue a
19
claim in the Vaccine Court. It allows claimants to overcome the
burden of causation if the vaccine in question is covered under the
Act, if the injury is included on the Vaccine Table (Table) of
associated injuries, and if no evidence indicates that something other
20
than the vaccine caused the injury. If the injury is not included on the
Table, but a claimant can prove that a vaccine caused the injury, the
21
claimant may also recover in Vaccine Court. The claimant is free to
accept or reject the Vaccine Court’s decision, and may then pursue
22
limited claims in state or federal court.
The Bruesewitz family unsuccessfully pursued its claim in Vaccine
Court. Because Hannah’s residual seizure disorder and
encephalopathy were no longer considered “Table” injuries, the
23
Vaccine Court dismissed the family’s claim without prejudice. To
proceed in Vaccine Court, Bruesewitz would need to prove causation24
in-fact. Bruesewitz, however, chose not to proceed in Vaccine Court
and instead sued Wyeth directly alleging the vaccine was defectively
25
designed by the company’s failure to produce a safer design.
26
The district court granted summary judgment for Wyeth. The
court held that the Vaccine Act preempts all design-defect claims
against FDA-approved vaccines from vaccine injures, both in
27
negligence and strict liability. The district court held that a case-bycase consideration would violate Congress’s intent to protect
28
29
manufacturers from suit. Bruesewitz appealed.
Over the last century, the federal government has assumed control
over the vaccine industry and has required approval of all
30
manufacturing, licensing, and marketing of vaccines. Since 1972, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has regulated all vaccines and
31
biologics. To market a vaccine in the United States, the vaccine

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-21(a) (West 2010).
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 238.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 2.
Id. at 4–6.
Id. at 6.
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manufacturer must receive authorization to conduct clinical trials
32
from the FDA. After clinical trials have been conducted, the vaccine
sponsor may apply for a biologics license and must prove that the
33
vaccine is “safe, pure, potent, and effective.” The vaccine is not
required to be the safest feasible design, and the FDA does not ensure
34
that drugs are optimally designed. Manufacturers must follow strict
regulations and may need subsequent FDA approval to change any
35
aspect of the vaccine. Much of the biomedical research on vaccine
safety and innovation is performed by the federal government at the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and many vaccine
recommendations and risk determinations are made by the Center for
36
Disease (CDC) and other medical groups. While the FDA relies on
an adverse event reporting system and post-marketing studies to
monitor any problems with approved vaccines, the FDA does not
have the authority to order a manufacturer to adopt a safer
37
alternative design for an already-licensed vaccine.
Wyeth developed the Tri-Immunol vaccine to protect against
38
Diphtheria, Pertussis, and Tetanus. The vaccine received marketing
39
approval in 1943. It was incredibly successful in reducing the
40
incidence of Pertussis in the United States. Although the vaccine
carried some risks (as all vaccines do), doctors and health officials
agreed that the benefits of the vaccine to the community outweighed
41
the risks to an individual. Vaccination of large numbers of people
42
causes “herd immunity” and thereby halts the spread of disease

32. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.2(a), 312.20–312.38 (West 2011).
33. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 6.
34. Id. at 6–7; Guidance for Industry: Providing Clinical Evidence of Effectiveness for
Human Drug and Biological Products, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 4 (May 1998),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/
UCM078749.pdf.
35. 21 C.F.R. § 601.12(b) (West 2011).
36. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 22–23,
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. July 23, 2010).
37. 21 C.F.R. § 601.12(b)(2)(i) (West 2011); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 9.
38. Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 18.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Brief for AAP, supra note 7, at 15; Brief for Buffler, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents (11 Scientists) at 13, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. July 30, 2010).
42. “Herd immunity,” also known as “community immunity,” refers to the protection
against certain diseases afforded to a given community by immunizing a high percentage of the
community. Thus, if a few members of the community are not immunized, the community is still
protected, as the disease will not be able to spread. If only a small percentage of the population
is immunized, the disease could cause an outbreak. CDC Vaccine Program Office: Glossary,
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43

throughout the community. Because of the overwhelming benefits of
herd immunity, state governments provide and require childhood
44
vaccinations for all public school students.
Tri-Immunol contained “whole cell” Pertussis vaccine, as well as
45
Diphtheria and Tetanus toxoids, to stimulate an immune response.
Although some scientists suspected that whole-cell vaccines might
cause some severe adverse reactions, several epidemiologic studies
46
47
dismissed those concerns. The vaccine did have some side effects,
but the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) removed
“residual seizure disorder” from the list of injuries associated with the
DPT vaccine in 1995 due to insufficient medical evidence supporting
48
a causal relationship. Although alternative DPT vaccines existed,
none were available for six-month-olds at the time of Hannah’s
49
inoculation.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Vaccine Act
50

Congress established the NVICP under the Vaccine Act in 1986.
Congress conceived of the program to resolve two issues. First,
Congress wanted to provide a more efficient, consistent, and costU.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/glossary1.htm (last visited
Jan. 15, 2011).
43. Brief for 11 Scientists, supra note 41, at 12.
44. National Vaccine Program Office School Immunization Laws, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/law.htm#School%20immunization
%20laws (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
45. Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 18. A “whole-cell” vaccine is prepared using the
whole inactivated bacterial cells. A toxoid refers to that inactivated cell.
46. Id. at 18–19.
47. Id.
48. Toner v. Lederle, 779 F.2d 1429, 1431 (9th Cir. 1986); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d
233, 237 n.5. (3d Cir. 2009).
49. Though this is a point of contention for petitioners, everyone agrees that no other
vaccine was actually on the market in the United States at the time. A “fractioned” cell vaccine
existed in the 1970s, but the FDA refused to relicense it, so it was no longer on the market. In
1991, the FDA approved the “accellular vaccine” for children two years or older, but did not
approve it for younger children until 1996. As of 1992, no alternative vaccines were available for
infants in the U.S. Toner, 779 F.2d at 1431; Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 236–37. Japan had adopted
the DTaP vaccine in the 1990s, but the Solicitor General stressed that the FDA and the CDC
would never allow the risks that Japan took by using the vaccine without adequate clinical trials.
Japan was battling an epidemic of 13,000 whooping cough cases after removing the DPT
Vaccine from the market. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 18–19; Brief for United States,
supra note 36, at 33.
50. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.
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effective system than civil litigation in response to concerns of
51
vaccine-injury victims and their families. Second, Congress sought to
address the potential for massive liability that threatened the viability
of the vaccine market—such liability reduced vaccine manufacturers’
ability to obtain insurance and substantially increased their legal
52
costs. In the ten years prior to the enactment of the NVICP, the
number of vaccine manufacturers shrank from twenty-six to just
53
four. From 1980 to 1986, plaintiffs sued vaccine manufacturers for
54
more than $3.5 billion in damages. Constant litigation threatened to
55
jeopardize the supply of essential childhood vaccines in the country.
Congress passed the Vaccine Act in an effort to balance both the
needs of the victims and vaccine providers.
The Vaccine Act contains an immunity provision, section
300aa-22, which protects manufacturers from civil liability claims for
56
“unavoidable” injuries. The statute, which is the source of
controversy in this litigation, reads:
No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for
damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated
with the administration of a vaccine . . . if the injury or death
resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though the
vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper
57
directions and warnings.

In section (e), the statute denies federal preemption of any state
58
claims that it does not expressly preempt. All parties agree that
defective-manufacturing claims and failure-to-warn state claims are
59
permitted under the Act, but whether the Vaccine Act preempts
design-defect state claims is unclear.
B. Federal Preemption in the FDA regulatory scheme
Bruesewitz turns on the Court’s understanding of what in fact is
preempted under the Vaccine Act. The federal government’s power to
51. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4 (2006).
52. Id. at 4–5.
53. Brief for GSK, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. July 23, 2010).
54. Id. at 7.
55. Id. at 7–8.
56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (West 2010).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id.
59. Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 46–47.
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draft regulations that preempt state law is derived from the
60
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Courts
61
recognize three types of preemption: express, implied, and field.
Express preemption refers to preemption explicitly mentioned in the
62
statutory text. Implied preemption is inferred if state law conflicts
63
with federal law. Field preemption, a form of implied preemption,
occurs when federal law occupies an area of the law so much that
64
there is no room for further state regulation. All three forms of
preemption require analysis of the statutory language and statutory
scheme to determine whether Congress clearly and manifestly
65
intended to preempt state law. If the relevant language is unclear,
66
courts presume that federal law does not preempt state law.
Recently, the Supreme Court addressed express and implied
federal preemption within the scope of the FDA-regulatory
67
68
framework. In Riegel v. Medtronic, the Court held that the text of
federal regulations preempted a New York negligence law that
required a FDA-approved device to be safer than the FDA requires
69
under the Medical Device Act (MDA). Because the MDA expressly
preempts state laws “different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable . . . to the device under federal law,” the Court
held that the FDA pre-market safety approval requirement written in
70
the MDA expressly preempts New York’s tort law. The majority
emphasized that the text of the MDA only preempts state
manufacturing defect and labeling rules, not design-defect claims,
71
which were left unaddressed by the MDA. In reaching its conclusion,
the Court deferred significantly to the FDA’s interpretation and relied
60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985).
61. Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S. at 713.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233, 243 (3d Cir. 2009).
66. Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
67. See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (holding that federal FDA
regulations do not preempt state tort laws because FDA regulations do not prohibit stronger
warning labels than approved); Riegel v. Medtronic, 555 U.S. 312 (2008) (finding that the
Medical Device Act expressly preempted state tort law); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486–87 (denying
that FDA regulations preempt state damages laws because they are not “different from” federal
regulations under the Medical Device Act).
68. Riegel v. Medtronic, 555 U.S. 312 (2008).
69. Id. at 325.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 322–23.
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heavily on statutory text of the MDA rather than its legislative
72
history.
73
Conversely, in Wyeth v. Levine, the Court held that federal
74
pharmaceutical labeling law does not implicitly preempt state law.
Because Wyeth could have substituted its label for a more stringent
75
one without violating FDA regulations, the Wyeth Court held that
76
the federal and state laws did not conflict, and thus the state law was
77
not preempted. Adherence to FDA-approved warning labels is not
sufficient because these labels serve as the low standard of adequate
warnings; state juries, the Court held, can decide whether labels
78
appropriately warned of risks above the FDA standard. The Court
stressed that if the FDA intended to preempt state law, it could have
79
included an express-preemption provision as it did in the MDA.
IV. HOLDING
In Bruesewitz, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court and
concluded that section 22(b)(1) of the Vaccine Act expressly
preempted design-defect claims given the legislative history and
80
structure of the Act. If courts were forced to engage in a case-bycase analysis to determine whether any vaccine’s side effects were
unavoidable, then all claims would go to a jury, and section (e)’s
81
preemption provision would be rendered meaningless. Additionally,
the Third Circuit determined that the Act showed a “‘clear and
manifest’ expression of congressional intent” to preempt designdefect claims based on the 1986 House Commerce Committee
82
Report. The court feared that allowing case-by-case evaluations of
almost every vaccine-injury claim would defeat Congress’s intent to
83
ensure the viability of the vaccine market.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 326.
Wyeth v. Levine, 239 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
Id.
Id. at 1196–97.
Id. at 1199.
Id.
Id. at 1230–31 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1200 (majority opinion).
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233, 242, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 246.
Id. at 246–51.
Id. at 246.
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V. ARGUMENTS
The Supreme Court’s analysis of all statutes, even express
84
preemption statutes, must begin with the statutory text. Both parties
agree that this case rests on the Court’s interpretation of the word
85
“unavoidable” in section 22(b). The Court likely will decide this
issue by relying heavily on congressional intent and the policy
implications of having state juries evaluate government public-health
decisions.
A. Bruesewitz’s (Petitioner’s) Argument
Bruesewitz argues that section 22(b) of the Vaccine Act holds
vaccine manufacturers liable for vaccine-related injuries if the
manufacturer could have designed a “safer alternative” to the
86
vaccine. According to Bruesewitz, within the context of the Act
“unavoidable” means that a manufacturer is liable if “the side effect
87
could have been avoided by a safer design.” Citing the 1986
Committee Report, Bruesewitz argues that section 22(b) only
codified an exemption for strict-liability design-defect claims carved
88
out as a common law tort in the Restatement of Torts. This clearly
demonstrates that Congress had no intention of preempting vaccines
89
from all design-related liability. Additionally, Bruesewitz cites
several state and federal cases that have defined “unavoidably
unsafe” as a product design that eliminates unnecessary risks of harm
90
that cannot be made safer. By the time the Vaccine Act was adopted
in 1986, “unavoidable” had adopted a specialized meaning in torts:
91
safety risks that cannot be eliminated by a safer alternative design.
Bruesewitz argues that the conditional structure of section 22
illustrates that the manufacturer must show “that the vaccine at issue

84. Id. at 239.
85. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 25; Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 24.
86. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 30–31.
87. Id. at 29 (citing the dictionary definition of “unavoidable” and the Restatement of
Torts).
88. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 39. Products liability experts agree that section
22(b) codifies comment K of the Restatement, which preempts only strict liability claims for
manufacturers, not negligence claims. Brief for Ken Starr and Erwin Chemerinsky as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. May 23, 2010); Brief
of Mark Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 5–20.
89. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 50–51.
90. Id. at 30.
91. Id. at 30–31.
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in the lawsuit was designed as safely as possible.” Otherwise,
Congress would have used clearer language to overcome the
93
presumption against preemption. For consistency with the plain
94
text, Bruesewitz urges the Court to read the “even though” clause of
the statute as preempting tort liability only if manufacturers have
properly labeled and manufactured the vaccine and endured a case95
by-case analysis of the vaccine’s side effects.
Relying on committee reports and media statements by members
of Congress at the time of and after the Act was passed, Bruesewitz
contends that legislative history clearly shows that Congress did not
96
intend to preempt state law. Bruesewitz points to the Energy and
Commerce Committee’s rejection of a proposed amendment to
immunize vaccine manufacturers from liability for failing to develop
97
safer designs. Furthermore, the 1986 Committee Report stresses that
the Vaccine Court should serve as an alternative to the tort system,
98
not a replacement.
Bruesewitz contends that permitting drug-manufacturer liability is
consistent with both Congress’s intent in enacting the Vaccine Act and
99
its policy goals. According to Bruesewitz, Congress intended to
100
promote vaccine safety and ensure fair compensation to victims. If
the law held manufacturers civilly liable, then manufacturers would be
encouraged to improve their designs and injured patients would be
101
properly compensated. Bruesewitz denies vaccine manufacturers’
contentions that increased liability would threaten the stability of the
vaccine market, alluding to undefined and unsubstantiated profits
102
that vaccines generate for manufacturers.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 44–51.
Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 51–57.
Id.
Id. at 54–55.
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 19, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2010).
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B. Wyeth’s (Respondent’s) Arguments
Wyeth argues that the Vaccine Act clearly preempts design-defect
103
claims. The company contends that the relevant statutory language
(“even though the vaccine was properly prepared”) modifies the
definition of what it means for a vaccine’s side effect to be
“unavoidable.” Bruesewitz, in contrast, argues that this language
104
creates additional requirements the drug manufacturer must meet.
Wyeth asserts that Bruesewitz’s interpretation of the statutory text is
a result of an alteration of Congress’s specific word choices—an
alteration that misstates congressional intent. Wyeth notes that the
Act says “side effects that were unavoidable even though . . . ,” not
“unavoidable side effects even though . . . ,” as Bruesewitz interprets
the language. This inversion of the statutory language, Wyeth
contends, changes the Act’s meaning, which was intended to shield
105
manufacturers from liability if they met their statutory obligations.
Bruesewitz, in contrast, interprets the Act to indemnify manufacturers
from liability only if the vaccine’s side effects are unavoidable and the
106
manufacturer fulfilled its additional legal obligations.
Wyeth stresses that the Vaccine Act provides mechanisms other
than liability to ensure that the industry continues to work on
producing safer vaccines—like making HHS responsible for
107
promoting and ensuring vaccine-safety development. Allowing caseby-case analyses would put that responsibility back into the hands of
juries, which tend to overlook the social benefits of vaccines and focus
108
only on the relatively small number of vaccine-related injuries. Thus,
the Vaccine Act relies on HHS to determine the most effective and
necessary vaccines rather than on an amalgam of state laws and jury
109
verdicts. Recognizing that vaccines necessarily have side effects,
Congress chose to compensate vaccine-injury victims through the
110
Vaccine Court, rather than state court. Wyeth argues that a jury’s
responsibilities should be limited to deciding manufacturing-defect
claims, so as to not interfere with HHS and FDA responsibilities.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 29.
Id.
Id. at 32–33.
Id.
Brief for United States, supra note 36, at 31; Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 36.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 36–37.
Id.
Id. at 37.
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Although Wyeth acknowledges that the Restatement of Torts may
help elucidate whether Congress intended the Vaccine Act to preempt
design-defect claims, it is not clear that the Restatement preempted
111
only strict liability. Before Congress passed the Vaccine Act, some
state courts had interpreted the relevant section of the Restatement
112
of Torts to preempt both strict and negligence liability. Because both
parties are calling for the preemption of some state common law, the
113
presumption against preemption is moot. And it is also not clear
that section 22(b) actually codified the exact restrictions in the
Restatement rather than the principles it provides of manufacturer
114
protection.
Finally, Wyeth refutes Bruesewitz’s main policy argument that
manufacturer liability is essential to protect public health and ensure
115
new vaccine developments. Since the 1986 enactment of the Vaccine
Act, manufacturers have brought over twenty new vaccines to market
116
even without liability for design-defect claims. Wyeth argues that
design-defect claims do not inherently encourage more disclosure
from manufacturers than a manufacturing-defect claim would (if
117
there is any additional information to disclose). In assessing the
vaccine market and enacting the Vaccine Act, Wyeth argues that
Congress sought to improve and protect public health not through
litigation, but by ensuring a ready supply of vaccines and preventing
118
manufacturers from leaving the market. With design-defect liability,
there would be an inevitable onslaught of litigation, which could have
119
a devastating effect on public health. The Solicitor General also
views the addition of tort claims as detrimental to the vaccine
120
industry, and ultimately public health.

111. Id. at 42.
112. Id. at 42–44.
113. Both parties are trying to preempt some state court decision with federal law
interpretation. Bruesewitz wants to preempt state court decisions that interpret comment K in
the Restatement of Torts as only preempting strict liability while Wyeth wants to preempt any
state decision interpreting comment K as preempting strict and negligence liability. If there is a
presumption against preemption, it should impact both parties equally. Therefore the
presumption should not hurt or help either party. Id. at 45.
114. Id. at 42 n.24.
115. Id. at 53–57.
116. Id. at 28.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 53–57.
119. Id. at 57.
120. Id. at 24–25.
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V. ANALYSIS
Although Hannah Bruesewitz’s case is emotionally moving, the
Court likely will find for Wyeth based on Wyeth’s policy rationale.
Because the statutory text and congressional intent are unclear, the
Court’s public policy preferences likely will determine the outcome of
this case.
Even though Wyeth’s public health argument is persuasive, Wyeth
must first overcome the presumption against preemption. Notable law
professors, including Ken Starr and Erwin Chemerinsky, argue that
the Third Circuit disregarded this presumption, and thus the Court
121
should reverse. Because the Vaccine Act does not contain a clear
and manifest purpose to preempt categorically, and because
Bruesewitz’s interpretation is equally plausible, Starr and
122
Chemerinsky advocate the preservation of state law. If Congress
intended to preempt design-defect claims, they argue, it would have
123
used clearer language. Another distinguished law professor, Mark
Geistfeld, also supports Bruesewitz’s interpretation based on the
124
Restatement of Torts. Like Bruesewitz, Geistfeld argues that the
Restatement’s liability exemption applies only to strict liability;
negligence liability must remain to incentivize producers to eliminate
125
unreasonably dangerous products from the market. That this
scheme might threaten the vaccine market is a necessary consequence
126
of tort law’s intent to promote product safety. Stressing the
legislative history of the Act, Geistfeld argues that the Vaccine Act
127
adopts the Restatement’s immunity for strict liability.
These arguments highlight Wyeth’s primary obstacle: where the
text and legislative history are ambiguous, preemption should be
128
avoided. Although the presumption against preemption is well-

121. See generally Brief for Starr and Chemerinsky, supra note 88 (arguing that the
principles of federalism require the presumption against preemption in this case).
122. Id. at 14–18.
123. Id. at 15.
124. See generally Brief for Mark Geistfeld, supra note 8 (explaining and applying the
principles of comment K to the Vaccine Act).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 6–7.
128. See supra notes 88 (contending that, despite Wyeth’s well-demonstrated arguments
stating otherwise, the Vaccine Act’s legislative history clearly adopts the Restatement of Torts)
and 121 (arguing that the Court should necessarily presume against preemption due to the lack
of clarity in the Vaccine Act)and accompanying text.
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established and generally followed, Congress stated that certain
130
sections of the Act are not preempted. This suggests that Congress
131
did intend for some parts to be preempted. Both parties provide
plausible interpretations of the statutory language. But, as the Third
Circuit points out, it would be unreasonable to find that nothing is
preempted when section (e) clearly indicates that the Act preempts
132
some state law. Though both liberal and conservative professors
argue that any preemption in the Vaccine Act is too subtle to
overcome the presumption against preemption, Wyeth could win the
support of both liberal and conservative justices on this point.
Conservative justices, like Justices Scalia and Alito, and Chief Justice
133
Roberts, recently have found preemption in even less clear cases.
More liberal justices, like Justice Breyer, may find design-defect
claims preempted based on the legislative history of the Act or based
on the threat to public health.
Despite Geistfeld’s arguments, the Vaccine Act’s legislative history
does not mention an explicit adoption of the Restatement of Torts.
Instead, a 1986 Committee Report expresses Congress’s intent to
embrace the “principles” of the Restatement of Torts and does not
distinguish between the Act’s preemption of strict and negligence
134
liability. Congress could have extended the Restatement’s immunity
from strict liability to negligence liability in an effort to safeguard the
vaccine market, but the Committee Report and the Act are unclear.

129. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (“In areas of traditional
state regulation, [the Supreme Court] assume[s] that a federal statute has not supplanted state
law unless Congress has made such an intention ‘clear and manifest.’”); see also City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (stating that presumption requires “evidence of a
clear and manifest purpose”); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
146–47 (1963) (“[W]e are not to conclude that Congress legislated [this] . . . in the absence of an
unambiguous congressional mandate to that effect . . . .”).
130. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(e) (West 2010) (“No State may establish or enforce a law
which prohibits an individual from bringing a civil action against a vaccine manufacturer for
damages for a vaccine-related injury or death if such civil action is not barred by this part.”).
131. Id.
132. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233, 246 (3d Cir. 2009).
133. Riegel v. Medtronic, 555 U.S. 312, 312 (2008) (Scalia, J., majority opinion); Wyeth v.
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1217 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
134. H. REP. No. 99-908, at 26 (1986) (“The Committee has set forth [c]omment K in this
bill because it intends that the principle in [c]omment K regarding ‘unavoidably unsafe’
products, i.e., those products which in the present state of human skill and knowledge cannot be
made safe, apply to the vaccines covered in the bill and that such products not be the subject of
liability in the tort system.”).
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As Wyeth demonstrates, the Restatement of Torts is not dispositive, as
135
it does not directly discuss the Vaccine Act.
Although both parties have equally plausible readings of the
statute, Bruesewitz’s definition of “unavoidable” renders its
136
interpretation unreasonable. Under United States v. Kirby, the Court
held that it avoids literal interpretations of statutes that lead to
137
absurd consequences. Bruesewitz asks the Court to recognize that
“unavoidable” had a special meaning as of 1986: “a product’s safety
risks are ‘unavoidable’ only when they cannot be eliminated by a
138
safer alternative design.” But any alternative design is inherently a
different product than that approved by the FDA, as any modification
139
to a design yields a new vaccine. Bruesewitz’s definition would lead
to an absurd consequence: it would hold manufacturers liable for
injuries if an alternative product could exist and manufacturers did
not implement it, even if the manufacturer does not have the licenses
or the ability to produce the alternative product. During oral
arguments, Justice Kennedy noted that Bruesewitz’s interpretation
would afford drug manufacturers even less protection than before
140
Congress passed the Vaccine Act. Moreover, Bruesewitz demands
“safer” vaccines, but ignores the real consequence that fewer side
141
effects may result in less effective vaccines. Bruesewitz essentially
asks the Court to regulate the choice of products a manufacturer
produces—a task that the government agrees should only be
142
performed by experts, doctors, and the FDA.
Contrary to Bruesewitz’s claims, imposing tort liability likely
would do little to improve safety, as manufacturers control very little
143
of the process involved in researching and developing vaccines.
HHS tightly regulates the vaccine development process and the NIH

135. Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, 40–41.
136. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1866).
137. Id. at 486 (“All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so
limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence . . .
.”).
138. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 30–31.
139. Brief for United States, supra note 36, at 32–33.
140. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, 16–17, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (2010).
141. Brief for United States, supra note 36, at 31 (“Guaranteeing that a vaccine is potent
enough to ensure that a disease is contained or eradicated in this way entails trade-offs between
safety and potency.”).
142. Id. at 19–23.
143. Id.
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actually performs much of the research. The federal government
weighs the risks and benefits of all of the available vaccines and
recommends a specific vaccine for routine administration based on
145
societal benefit. In 1992 it recommended only Wyeth’s DPT
146
vaccine. Furthermore, most of the amici advocating tort law to
improve vaccine safety express great dissatisfaction with the Vaccine
147
Court and updates to the Table. This is not an issue that should be
addressed in this case; though the Vaccine Act and its injury table may
be significantly out of date, failures on the part of Congress and HHS
are not adequate reasons to impose additional liability on
manufacturers.
As most of the medical professional amici agree, Wyeth’s policy
argument that immunity avoids market collapse and more effectively
prevents outbreaks is more persuasive than Bruesewitz’s argument
148
that tort liability strengthens the vaccine market. While Bruesewitz
denies that this is a serious problem, vaccine manufacturing is
inherently costly and yields very little financial rewards for
companies—their biggest customer is the government which receives
149
vaccines at reduced costs. When the Vaccine Act was created,
vaccine manufacturers faced lawsuits for DPT-related injuries from
plaintiffs seeking more than thirty times the market value of the DPT
150
vaccine.
Expert scientists and doctors agree that immunizing
vaccines from liability is the best way to prevent the vaccine market
151
from collapsing. And due to the reputation of these amici, most
notably the American Academy of Pediatrics, their arguments
probably will weigh heavily in the justices’ minds when they make
152
their decision.

144. Id.
145. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 41, 48–51.
146. Id. at 48–53.
147. See e.g., Brief for Marguerite Willner as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 20–
31, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (May 24, 2010) (arguing that the Table injuries are
incomplete); Brief of Vaccine Injured Petitioners Bar Association, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, at 9–18, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (May 24, 2010) (arguing that
the vaccine compensation system is not working.).
148. See Brief of AAP, supra note 7, at 23–27; Brief of 11 Scientists, supra note 41, at 20.
149. Id. at 11–12.
150. Id. at 13.
151. See Brief of AAP, supra note 7, at 9–10; see also Brief for 11 Scientists, supra note 41, at
15.
152. Justice Breyer expressed his trust in the American Academy of Pediatrics’ policy
evaluation in contrast to statements he has made in prior opinions. Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 140, at 16.
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Based on the dissents in other preemption cases it is likely this
153
case will split 5-3 for Wyeth. Wyeth likely has the support of at least
Justices Alito and Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts based on the tenor
of their dissent in Wyeth v. Levine and the nature of their questioning
154
and comments during Bruesewitz’s oral arguments.
Justices
Ginsburg and Thomas have made their views of policy and statutory
interpretation apparent. Justice Ginsburg voted against preemption in
155
a much more straightforward express-preemption case, and Justice
Thomas consistently votes in favor of strict adherence to the
presumption against preemption when clear language does not
156
indicate otherwise. Justice Breyer’s concern for the vaccine market
157
and Justice Kennedy’s apprehension about the expense of litigation
both lean in favor of Wyeth. Justice Sotomayor’s position remains
unclear, but during oral arguments she indicated a distrust of
158
government oversight of the vaccine industry.
Given the evidence indicating Congress’s intent to protect the
vaccine market and the support of medical professionals for vaccine
companies in this case, Wyeth ultimately seems poised to win. While
scientists and doctors understand that no vaccine is completely safe,
159
most agree that it is still safer to take one than not. And even those
who do not take the vaccine benefit from them: herd immunity
160
prevents epidemics and widespread disease. Therefore, there is a
strong societal and public welfare interest in preserving the vaccine
market. Too often juries overlook the public welfare arguments and
see only the tragic story before them. As Justice Scalia wrote, “[a] jury
. . . sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is not
concerned with its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits
161
are not represented in court.” This thought concerned even Justice
162
Ginsburg, the lone dissent in Riegel v. Medtronic, who asked
Bruesewitz “if there’s a safer alternative, it must be pursued

153. Justice Kagan will take no part in this decision due to her previous role as Solicitor
General.
154. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1217 (2009) (Alito, J., joined by Scalia, J., and
Roberts, C.J., dissenting). See also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 5–11.
155. Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 333 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
156. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring).
157. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 24.
158. Id. at 30–32.
159. Brief for AAP, supra note 7, at 15.
160. Brief for 11 Scientists, supra note 41, at 11–12.
161. Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008).
162. Id. at 333 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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regardless of costs?” While the decision in this case should turn only
on the Court’s interpretation of the Vaccine Act, the Court cannot
and likely will not overlook the policy implications when it votes in
Wyeth’s favor.

163. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 14.

